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Abstract: 
All major systems of belief claim to have a distinctive 
understanding and relation to whatever they may consider the unseen 
divine entity. Present neuropsychological theories are divided between the 
possible existence of “God-modules” hardwired in the brain, on one hand, 
and God as a construction of the brain’s incapacity to explain unknown and 
unidentified events. In Theravāda Buddhism there is no personal deity; one 
experiences the ultimate as impersonal. The idea of self is also rejected and 
a Buddhist identity is pointing out towards “othoproxy”, “the right 
practice”, what could be called “action identity”. 
Keywords: action identity, neuropsychological theories, religion, 
Buddhism, reality. 
Motto:  
[The] spirit of tolerance and compassion has been one of the most 
highly regarded ideals of the Buddhist culture and civilisation from the 
outset. This is why there is not one single example of persecution or of one 
drop of blood being shed either in the conversion of people to Buddhism or 
in the spread of Buddhism over its two thousand five hundred year history1. 
(Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, 1959). 
As contradictory as it may seem, all major systems of belief claim to 
have a distinctive understanding and relation to whatever they may consider 
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 Faure, B., Unmasking Buddhism. Wiley-Blackwell: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication, 
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the unseen divine entity. These two aspects, the specific understanding and 
the relation that holds, would subsequently yield distinctive beliefs, rituals, 
practices, and ethical values that would eventually bind together its 
followers into separate religious traditions. It seems therefore that the 
distinctiveness we attribute to the divine is our cognitive, affective and 
phenomenological construction and has little, if at all, to do with the unseen 
itself. These constructions typically, but not necessarily, center on a 
maximally great, highly esteemed being, God. The subjective awareness of 
God experienced by a seer, a prophet or a saint becomes collectively 
accepted and attempted as a means of verification, re-experience. As in the 
case of scientific theories, repetition of an experiment becomes the proof, 
proving it true or accurate. Each of these subjective experiences has been 
experienced by someone and each one of them had a particular way of 
explanation for what had happened to them. As Dummett (1973: 227) puts 
it, “in saying what the reference is, we have to choose a particular way of 
saying this”. This could be the reason of the distinctions constructed upon 
the unseen divine entity.  
If, as Eliade (1958: 12) claims, the history of religions is “constituted 
by a great number of hierophanies, manifestations of the sacred realities”, 
then with each one of them we add different meanings to the unseen entity. 
Moreover, if we are to connect ourselves to them, then we could attempt to 
do it through understanding and relating ourselves to whatever they would 
represent. These hierophanies – the manifestation of the sacred in a stone, or 
a tree, or, for a Christian, in the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ – would 
have to reveal something beyond what they apparently seem to be – a stone 
different from all other stones, a tree being more than every other tree, a 
human being different from others, etc. What relates us to them could be our 
recognition of their special attributes of sacredness, as seeing them standing 
apart from the rest of the empirical profane realities. There would be hence, 
on one hand, the manifestation of the sacred and, on the other hand, us, who 
would attempt on understanding and relate to them. The idea of the religious 
identity seems to rise from this specific endeavor of understanding such a 
manifestation and from the specific relation we would posit ourselves 
concerning it. It is therefore not surprising that the concept of religious 
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identity is shared by the individual as well as the groups of individuals. 
Individually, it is the construction of one’s personal beliefs, practices, 
actions, and values. Collectively, it creates communities of individuals 
sharing similar beliefs, performing similar practices and deeds, holding 
similar axiological attitudes, building together a different tradition in their 
advantage, around their version of “truth”. At the same time, both, our 
understanding and relation we posit ourselves, are social constructions, 
historically related to one’s surrounding.  
If, as Damasio (1999) puts it, “in antiquity, the unknown factors 
were called gods and destiny”2, then the divinity could be merely a 
construction of our unfeasibility of explaining unidentified factors. Dawkins 
(1989:172) considers that the idea of God, generated probably by 
“independent mutations”, have been replicated by written or spoken word, 
as well as the arts.  
The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from 
its great psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer 
to deep and troubling questions about existence. It suggests that injustices 
in this world may be rectified in the next. The “everlasting arms” hold out 
a cushion against our own inadequacies which, like a doctor’s placebo, is 
none the less effective for being imaginary. These are some of the reasons 
why the idea of God is copied so readily by successive generations of 
individual brains. God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high 
survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human 
culture.  
If, on the other hand, we are the upshot of a divine entity, as most 
religious doctrines claim, then we could hope to establish a connection 
between us and our creator, whoever she/he might be. Ramachandran (1998) 
hopes that future research would provide a way to approach religion from a 
scientific perspective and a “God module” in the brain that could be 
genetically specified. 
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In this broad context, we shall try looking at what might constitute a 
religious identity in Buddhism, which exists in many forms, some of which 
recognize no personal divine entity. In Theravāda Buddhism there is no 
personal deity; one experiences the ultimate as impersonal. The idea of self 
is also rejected and the Buddha, 2500 years ago, claimed that it is the 
clinging to the false idea of a self that produces all human sufferings.  
The proposed “private inner space” of St. Augustine (1991), where 
man and God would meet to reconcile, would not bear much significance in 
Buddhism, as the sense of identity as a separate autonomous self is absent. 
In Western philosophical thought, Hume thought that the self is not 
an entity. He considered that the individual’s self is a memory of series of 
impressions, nothing more than a “bundle of sensations”. Parfit (1987) thus 
refers to the Buddha as the first bundle theorist. 
A religious doctrine defines itself in relation to its “other.” 
Christianity is defined by its dogma and orthodoxy and has asserted itself 
during the course of its history through its constant fight against heresy. 
Unlike Christianity, Buddhism does not strictly speak of dogma or 
orthodoxy; at most it speaks of “orthopraxy” or “correct practice.”3 It could 
be argued that there is not one Buddhism, but rather several. This plurality is 
due, in part, to the absence of a central authority in contrast to Christianity 
(and to a lesser extent Islam). It is also linked to the belief that the 
conventional truths of Buddhism are adapted to individual capabilities and 
that their value is therefore purely pragmatic, as a kind of “skillful means” 
(upāya). It is therefore rare to find a spirit of sectarianism or fanaticism in 
Buddhism4.
Some prefer to call the teaching of the Buddha a religion, others call 
it a philosophy. Still others think of it as both religion and philosophy. It 
may, however, be more correct to call it a “Way of life”. But that does not 
mean that Buddhism is nothing more than an ethical code. Far from it, it is a 
way of moral, spiritual and intellectual training leading to complete freedom 
of mind. The Buddha himself called his teaching “Dhamma-vinaya”, the 
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Doctrine and the Discipline. But Buddhism, in the strictest sense of the 
word, cannot be called a religion, for if by religion is meant  
Action or conduct indicating belief in, reverence for, and desire to 
please, a divine ruling power; the exercise or practice of rites or 
observances implying this…; recognition on the part of man of some 
higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled 
to obedience, reverence, and worship.  
Buddhism certainly is not such a religion5.
In Buddhist thought, there is no awareness or conviction of the 
existence of a Creator of any form who rewards and punishes the good and 
ill deeds of the creatures of his creation. A Buddhist takes refuge in the 
Buddha (buddham saranam gacchami) but not in the hope that he will be 
saved by the Master. The Buddha is only a teacher who points out the way 
and guides the followers to their individual deliverance6.
In Buddhism, wisdom is of the highest importance; for purification 
comes through wisdom, through understanding. But the Buddha never 
praised mere intellect. According to him, knowledge should go hand in hand 
with purity of heart, with moral excellence (vijjacaranasampanna). Wisdom 
gained by understanding and development of the qualities of mind and heart 
is wisdom par excellence (bhavanamayapanna). It is saving knowledge, and 
not mere speculation, logic or specious reasoning. Thus it is clear that 
Buddhism is neither mere love of, nor inducing the search after wisdom, nor 
devotion (though they have their significance and bearing on mankind), but 
an encouragement of a practical application of the teaching that leads the 
follower to dispassion, enlightenment and final deliverance7.
The Buddha’s teaching 
The first part, wisdom, instructs us to acquire a thorough 
comprehension of the Four Noble Truths and all that they involve. However, 
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 Piyadassi, “The teaching of Buddha”, Kolkata: The Bengal Buddhist Association, 
Chowdhury, H. B. (ed.) Jagajjyoti 2550 Buddha Jayanti, Volume 2006, p. 25.  
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid., p. 26. 
 120
it does not require us to answer philosophical questions unrelated to 
attaining Nibbāna. In fact, this is discouraged, as we saw in the story of the 
man wounded by the arrow.  
Comprehension of the Four Noble Truths requires more than 
intellectual cultivation. We also need a fundamental commitment to 
understanding them, and our emotions and desires must be disciplined so 
that they do not distract us or lead us astray. Hence, the Buddha said we 
must renounce sensual desire, ill will, and cruelty. In this respect, he thought 
thinking and feeling, the mind and the heart, were closely connected. 
The second part of the path concerns morality or ethics. 
Enlightenment requires moral as well as intellectual and emotional 
preparation. The Buddha spoke of morality at length, and he expected much 
more of members of the sangha (monks) than of lay followers. But there are 
basic precepts that apply to all persons. These fall into three categories. 
Right speech requires that we speak in ways that are truthful, friendly, 
useful, and productive of harmony. Right action dictates that we do not kill 
any living beings (human or animal), nor steal, nor have illegitimate sexual 
relations. Right livelihood says we should not earn our living by harming 
others (for example, by selling arms). Violation of these precepts, the 
Buddha thought, would only reinforce self-centered desires and would 
hinder attainment of Nibbāna.
The third part of the path – concentration, or meditation – is the least 
familiar to persons in the West, but the most significant for the Buddha. 
Later we will need to consider the epistemological importance he assigned 
to meditation in understanding the Four Noble Truths. Though the Buddha 
taught many forms of meditation, the general aim of these mental 
disciplines is twofold: first, to purify the mind of disturbances so as to bring 
about a peaceful, concentrated, attentive and mindful mental state; and 
second, to know reality as it actually is by observing that all things in our 
ordinary experience are impermanent, involve suffering, and are empty of 
any self. The ultimate aim is not to escape from the world nor to acquire 
special powers: it is to attain Nibbāna.8
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Albahari (2006) puts the question, “is the ordinary self an illusion 
and, if so, is it constructed in such a way that could potentially allow for its 
dismantlement (such that consciousness could possibly become liberated)?”, 
and he bestows illusory status to the self as a whole, but a non-illusory 
status to several features that are ascribed to the self, features that, he 
argues, are intrinsic to consciousness. He argues that  
[…] the self is an illusion contributed to by two strands or tiers. 
One tier is naturally unified consciousness – itself non-illusory. The other 
tier is grounded in a stream of desire-driven thoughts, emotions and 
perceptions. The content of these thoughts (and so forth) merge with native 
consciousness to create the impression of a conscious, unified, separate 
self. The illusion lies in the fact that while this self purports to think up the 
thoughts, the thoughts, in fact, help think up the self. 
Distin (2005:5) mentions a relevant question put forward by Daniel 
Dennett and Susan Blackmore:  
If our mental and cultural lives are the result of a mindless 
evolutionary algorithm, how can we claim autonomous identity as 
independent “selves”, with freedom and control over what goes on in those 
lives? 
Practical identity is a complex matter [...] You are a human being, a 
woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic 
group, a member of a certain profession, someone’s lover or friend, and so 
on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your 
reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from 
what that identity forbids.9
The Buddha denied the existence of the self as an ontological 
distinct entity, separating one from another, and endowed with essential and 
unchanging properties. Generally, the self is considered as possessing 
properties such as the capacity to experience, imagine, feel, think, 
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remember, decide, and act, as well as being reflective upon itself. The 
Buddha’s concept of the self is nothing else but five aggregates: material 
form (sense organs), feeling and sensations, perceptions or cognitions, 
mental formations, and consciousness10.
Just as a dog, tied by a leash to a post or stake, keeps running 
around and circling around that very post or stake; in the same way, an 
uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person – is not well-versed or disciplined in 
their Dhammā – assumes [khandhās (form, feeling, perception, mental 
formations, consciousness)] to be the self, or the self as possessing 
[khandhās], or [khandhās] as in the self, or the self as in [khandhās]. 
He keeps running around and circling around that very form […] 
that very feeling […] that very perception […] those very fabrications […] 
that very consciousness.  
He is not set loose from form, not set loose from feeling […] from 
perception […] from fabrications […] not set loose from consciousness.  
He is not set loose from birth, aging, and death; from sorrows, 
lamentations, pains, distresses, and despairs. He is not set loose, I tell you, 
from suffering and stress. 
[The mode to aspire is where one] doesn’t assume [khandhās] to 
be the self, or the self as possessing [khandhās], or [khandhās] as in the 
self, or the self as in [khandhās]. He doesn’t run around or circle around 
that very form […] that very feeling […] that very perception […] those 
very fabrications […] that very consciousness.  
He is set loose from form, set loose from feeling […] from 
perception […] from fabrications […] set loose from consciousness. He is 
set loose from birth, aging, and death; from sorrows, lamentations, pains, 
distresses, and despairs. He is set loose, I tell you, from suffering and 
stress. (Samyuttā, Nikāya  XXII. 99). 
A close examination of each one of these khandhās, the Buddha 
thought, would show their changing character, their impermanence. Seen 
from this perspective, the soul is thus not ontologically different from one 
another and unchanged since none of the components that is made up of is 
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permanent. Through this state of change of everything, everything in the 
universe, except Nibbāna, is interconnected.  
The most distinctive and yet counter-intuitive feature of the 
Buddha’s message is the doctrine that there is no self (anattā)11. Our 
experience tells us that the sun rises each morning in the east, travels across 
the sky through the day, and sets in the evening in the west. This is as 
obvious as can be. It is a matter of common sense. But it is also completely 
false. The sun only appears to be going through these motions because, 
unbeknown to ordinary experience, the earth revolves. Likewise, the 
Buddha maintained, it seems obvious that we are selves, but this belief is an 
illusion12.
In the first discourse, addressed to the ascetic samanas, the Buddha 
described the Eightfold Path as a “middle way” that avoids two extremes: 
“The pursuit of sensual happiness in sensual pleasures, which is low, vulgar, 
the way of worldliness, ignoble, unbeneficial; and the pursuit of self-
mortification, which is painful, ignoble, unbeneficial.” Though the Buddha 
portrayed the Eightfold Path as a middle way between seeking sensual 
happiness and undergoing self-mortification, it clearly involves a rigorous 
regime that is supposed to radically transform us. This path, the Buddha 
said, “leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna.” 
(C II 1844)13.
Since the Buddhist identity cannot be said to be related to the 
concept of the self, it could, however, according to the Buddha, be related to 
the basic principles that apply to all Buddhists, both monks and lay 
followers. These principles fall into three categories: right speech, right 
action and right livelihood and comprise eight steps. These eight steps of the 
path are to be pursued not in sequence, but all together, with each step 
reinforcing the others (though the last two, right mindfulness and right 
concentration, are the culmination). The Buddha divided these steps into 
three parts: wisdom pertains primarily to intellectual development and 
conviction (right view and intention), virtue concerns moral or ethical 
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training (right speech, action, and livelihood), and concentration – often 
rendered as “meditation” – involves a set of mental disciplines (right effort, 
mindfulness, and concentration)14.
 The Four Noble Truths 
(1) Duhkha – All existence is suffering. (2) Samudāya – Suffering is 
caused by craving. (3) Nirodha – Suffering can have an end. (4) Mārga – 
The way to the end of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path. 
Every aspect of life is regulated by Dharma, from the succession of 
the seasons to the movement of the planets and constellations. Dharma is 
neither caused by nor under the control of a supreme being, and the gods 
themselves are subject to its laws, as was the Buddha. In the moral order, 
Dharma is manifest in the law of karma, which, as we shall see below, 
governs the way moral deeds affect individuals in present and future lives. 
Living in accordance with Dharma and implementing its requirements is 
thought to lead to happiness, fulfillment, and salvation; neglecting or 
transgressing it is said to lead to endless suffering in the cycle of rebirth 
(samsāra).15
In his first sermon, the Buddha was said to have “turned the wheel of 
the Dharma” and given doctrinal expression to the truth about how things 
are in reality. It was in this discourse that the Buddha set out the Four Noble 
Truths, the last of which is the Noble Eightfold Path which leads to nirvana. 
The Path has three divisions – Morality (śīla), Meditation (samādhi), and 
Insight (prajñā) – from which it can be seen that morality is an integral 
component of the path to nirvana. 
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The Eightfold Path and its Three Divisions 
Three 
Divisions 
Insight/Wisdom 
(Sanskrit: prajñā,  
Pāli: paññā) 
Morality 
(Sanskrit: śīla,  
Pāli: sīla) 
Concentration 
(Sanskrit and  
Pāli: samādhi) 
Eightfold 
Path 
Right view 
Right resolve/intention 
Right speech 
Right action 
Right livelihood 
Right effort 
Right understanding 
Right meditation 
Purpose Understanding of the nature of 
a thing; 
In psychology, awareness of 
one’s own nature  
Behavior, 
conduct 
Focus 
Table 1. The Eightfold Path and its Three Divisions 
The Four Nobel Truths followed by the Eightfold Path, the Buddha 
believed, lead to the cessation of suffering.  
Cause and Effect 
Buddhist dialectics have to evolve a new conception to causality. 
Buddhism has no interest in God or in His revelation. For Buddhists the test 
of good and bad deeds is “Good for many or bad for many” 
(Bahujanahitaya-Bahujanasukhai). In the same way, the test for any real 
thing is its effectiveness which can be realized by direct perception. There is 
no physical link between cause and effect, because the moment the cause 
appears, there is no effect, and, when the effect appears, the previous cause 
is no more. Nothing is transferred from cause to effect. The same process 
follows and effect, in its turn, becomes the cause of another effect. This is 
discontinuous continuity of the things which make the inner and the outer 
world. About cause and effect the Buddha said: “This was (in being), then it 
becomes” (“asmin-sati idam bhavati”). The cause is the thing which was 
present before the effect came into being. This is the nature of the elements 
(Dharmas) which in their totally make the world. 
Buddhist philosophy does not recognize the authority of the 
scriptures or the word of the prophets. It recognizes direct perception as the 
only means of real knowledge. Even inference is not accepted as a reliable 
source of knowledge. Its authority is accepted if it is supported by direct 
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perception. Buddhists believe reasoning is not the main criterion of finding 
the truth, but that truth should be experimentally proved by its 
effectiveness.16
Doctrine of Karma 
In Theravāda Buddhism the fundamental basis of practical life is 
based on the doctrine of karma. The doctrine of karma is concerned with the 
ethical implications of Dharma, in particular those relating to the 
consequences of moral behaviour. Karma is not a system of rewards and 
punishments meted out by God but a kind of natural law akin to the law of 
gravity. In popular usage in the West, karma is thought of simply as the 
good and bad things that happen to a person, a little like good and bad luck. 
However, this oversimplifies what for Buddhists is a complex of interrelated 
ideas which embraces both ethics and belief in reincarnation. The literal 
meaning of the Sanskrit word karma is “action”, but karma as a religious 
concept is concerned not with just any actions but with actions of a 
particular kind. Karmic actions are moral actions, and the Buddha defined 
karma by reference to moral choices and the acts consequent upon them. He 
stated, “It is intention (cetanā), O monks, that I call karma; having willed 
one acts through body, speech, or mind” (A.iii.415)17.
Moral actions are unlike other actions in that they have both 
transitive and intransitive effects. The transitive effect is seen in the direct 
impact moral actions have on others; for example, when we kill or steal, 
someone is deprived of his life or property. The intransitive effect is seen in 
the way moral actions affect the agent. According to Buddhism, human 
beings have free will, and in the exercise of free choice they engage in self-
determination. In a very real sense, individuals create themselves through 
their moral choices. By freely and repeatedly choosing certain sorts of 
things, individuals shape their characters, and through their characters their 
futures. As the English proverb has it: “Sow an act, reap a habit; sow a 
habit, reap a character; sow a character, reap a destiny.” The process of 
creating karma may be likened to the work of a potter who moulds the clay 
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into a finished shape: the soft clay is one’s character, and when we make 
moral choices we hold ourselves in our hands and shape our natures for 
good or ill. It is not hard to see how even within the course of a single 
lifetime particular patterns of behaviour lead inexorably to certain results. 
Great works of literature reveal how the fate that befalls the protagonists is 
due not to chance but to a character flaw that leads to a tragic series of 
events. The remote effects of karmic choices are referred to as the 
“maturation” (vipāka) or “fruit” (phala) of the karmic act. The metaphor is 
an agricultural one: performing good and bad deeds is like planting seeds 
that will fruit at a later date. Othello’s jealousy, Macbeth’s ruthless 
ambition, and Hamlet’s hesitation and self-doubt would all be seen by 
Buddhists as karmic seeds, and the tragic outcome in each case would be the 
inevitable “fruit” of the choices these character-traits predisposed the 
individual to make. Individuals are thus to a large extent the authors of their 
good and bad fortune18.
Not all the consequences of what a person does are experienced in 
the lifetime in which the deeds are performed. Karma that has been 
accumulated but not yet experienced is carried forward to the next life, or 
even many lifetimes ahead. Certain key aspects of a person’s next rebirth 
are thought of as karmically determined. These include the family into 
which one is born, one’s social status, physical appearance, and of course, 
one’s character and personality, since these are simply carried over from the 
previous life. The doctrine of karma, however, does not claim that 
everything that happens to a person is karmically determined. Many of the 
things that happen in life – like winning a raffle or catching a cold – may 
simply be random events or accidents. Karma does not determine precisely 
what will happen or how anyone will react to what happens, and individuals 
are always free to resist previous conditioning and establish new patterns of 
behaviour19.
What, then, makes an action good or bad? From the Buddha’s 
definition above, it can be seen to be largely a matter of intention and 
choice. The psychological springs of motivation are described in Buddhism 
                                                
18
 Ibid., p. 6.  
19
 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
 128
as “roots”, and there are said to be three good roots and three bad roots. 
Actions motivated by greed (rāga), hatred (dveśa), and delusion (moha) are 
bad (akuśala), while actions motivated by their opposites – non-attachment, 
benevolence, and understanding – are good (kuśala). Making progress to 
enlightenment, however, is not simply a matter of having good intentions, 
and evil is sometimes done by people who act from the highest motives. 
Good intentions, therefore, must find expression in right actions, and right 
actions are basically those that are wholesome and do no harm to either 
oneself or others. The kinds of actions that fail these requirements are 
prohibited in various sets of precepts, about which more will be said 
below20.
The most general moral duties are those found in the Five Precepts, 
for example the duty to refrain from evil acts such as killing and stealing. 
On becoming a Buddhist, one formally “takes” (or accepts) the precepts in a 
ritual context known as “going for refuge”, and the form of words used 
acknowledges the free and voluntary nature of the duty assumed21.
 Buddhist Morality 
Morality is woven into the fabric of Buddhist teachings and there is 
no major branch or school of Buddhism that fails to emphasize the 
importance of the moral life. The scriptures of Buddhism in every language 
speak eloquently of virtues such as non-violence and compassion, and the 
Buddhist version of the “Golden Rule” counsels us not to do anything to 
others we would not like done to ourselves. Although newcomers to 
Buddhism are often struck by the variety of the different Asian traditions, as 
divergent in form as Zen and Tibetan Buddhism, at the level of moral 
teachings there is much common ground. Some might disagree, but my own 
view is that we can speak of a common moral core underlying the divergent 
customs, practices, and philosophical teachings of the different schools. 
This core is composed of the principles and precepts, and the values and 
virtues expounded by the Buddha in the 5th century BCE and which 
                                                
20
 Ibid., p.7. 
21
 Ibid., p. 8. 
 129
continue to guide the conduct of some 350 million Buddhists around the 
world today22.
Dharma 
The ultimate foundation for Buddhist ethics is Dharma. Dharma has 
many meanings, but the underlying notion is of a universal law which 
governs both the physical and moral order of the universe. Dharma can best 
be translated as “natural law”, a term that captures both its main senses, 
namely as the principle of order and regularity seen in the behaviour of 
natural phenomena, and also the idea of a universal moral law whose 
requirements have been revealed by enlightened beings such as the Buddha 
(note that the Buddha claimed only to have discovered Dharma, not to have 
invented it)23.
The Five Precepts (pañcaśīla) 
This is the most widely known list of precepts in Buddhism, 
comparable in influence to the Ten Commandments of Christianity. The 
Five Precepts are undertaken as voluntary commitments in the ceremony of 
“going for refuge” when a person becomes a Buddhist. 
They are as follows: (1) I undertake the precept to refrain from 
harming living creatures. (2) I undertake the precept to refrain from taking 
what has not been given. (3) I undertake the precept to refrain from sexual 
immorality. (4) I undertake the precept to refrain from speaking falsely. (5) I 
undertake the precept to refrain from taking intoxicants.24
We might summarize the key points of this brief survey by saying 
that Buddhist moral teachings are thought to be grounded in the cosmic law 
of Dharma rather than commandments handed down by God. Buddhism 
holds that the requirements of this law have been revealed by enlightened 
teachers and can be understood by anyone who develops the necessary 
insight. In leading a moral life, a person becomes the embodiment of 
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Dharma, and anyone who lives in this way and keeps the precepts can 
expect good karmic consequences, such as happiness in this life, a good 
rebirth in the next, and eventually the attainment of nirvana.  
Buddhist moral teachings emphasize self-discipline (especially for 
those who have chosen the life of a monk or nun), generosity (dāna), non-
violence (ahimsā), and compassion (karunā). Mahāyāna Buddhism places a
special emphasis on service to others, which at times has led to a conflict 
between compassion and keeping the precepts. While the notion of Skilful 
Means and Tantric teachings have both had some influence on Buddhist 
ethics, the mainstream view has remained that the precepts express 
requirements of Dharma that should not be contravened25.
Buddhism does not impose moral obligations on anyone. However, 
this overlooks the fact that Dharmic obligations exist whether or not one 
formally acknowledges or accepts them: bad karma will follow a misdeed 
regardless of whether or not one has formally taken the precepts. It would 
appear, therefore, that there is a subsisting deontological obligation to live 
morally incumbent on us all26.
Compassion            
Compassion is an important Buddhist moral value, and some sources 
reveal an increasing awareness of how a commitment to the alleviation of 
suffering can create a conflict with the principle of respect for life. 
Compassion, for example, might lead one to take life in order to alleviate 
suffering, and indeed is one of the main grounds on which euthanasia is 
commonly advocated27.
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Buddhism and modernity 
The encounter between Buddhists and modernity has produced 
several significant developments with respect to how the Buddhist religion 
is represented and practiced28.
This disruptive effect of globalization has contributed to 
distinctively modern reworkings of what it means to be Buddhist and how 
one can model and develop this identity in practice. And consequently, it 
becomes ever more important for scholars to recognize that totalizing and 
essentialzing claims made on what constitutes Buddhist identity and 
tradition are, at root, historically contingent and differently authorized 
within the shifting grounds of contemporary debates over issues such as 
politics and religion (Abeysekara 2002, 15-16). In other words, it has 
become increasingly easy for people to contest and revise notions of 
authenticity and legitimacy in Buddhism – to differentiate between that 
which is Buddhist and that which is not – because there are a plurality of 
authorities and interpretations on which to advance and sustain such 
claims29.
The Four Noble Truths comprise the assertions:  (1) life in the cycle 
of birth and death (or samsara) is characterized by suffering (dukkha) or 
dissatisfaction, (2) dukkha is caused by ignorance and desire for sense 
pleasures that cannot be maintained without end, (3) one can put an end to 
the pain and dissatisfaction normally experienced in life, and (4) the way to 
put an end to dukkha is to follow the Noble Eightfold Path. While these 
assertions do offer a concise summary of some important Buddhist insights, 
the importance of the Four Noble Truths in the modern period is founded 
equally on the conviction that they reflect the Buddha’s original message 
and on their rationalistic assessment of the human condition30. The Four 
Noble Truths are the centerpiece of the Buddha’s message, an important 
commentary in the Theravāda tradition31.
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Modern discussions of the Four Noble Truths often link this concept 
with the notion of the Buddhist path as the Middle Way between sensual 
indulgence and self-mortification. While this same connection is made in 
the Samyutta Nikaya of the Pali Canon (Bodhi 2000, 1843–1844), the 
ascetic moderation preached by the Buddha has been greatly expanded in 
recent decades to include a wider range of ordinary lay behavior. Strenuous 
religious practice and prohibitions can be relaxed if one’s intentions are 
generally good and one maintains whatever standards for religious practice 
are recognized within one’s own cultural environment. Modern practitioners 
are likely to emphasize the importance of intention in determining the moral 
quality of one’s actions, as some Buddhist texts assert. Thus, if karma is 
determined by the relative wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of the 
intention behind one’s deeds, Buddhist practitioners can be expected to 
focus at least some of their efforts on trying to purify their minds and 
motivations. Barring complete success in this endeavor, however, people 
may also try to earn merit, or the unripened fruits of morally beneficial 
deeds, in the hope of canceling out the potential negative fruits of deeds they 
performed out of selfish or malicious intentions. The flexibility built into the 
notion of the Middle Way in Buddhism may be adjusted to speak to both 
monastic and lay communities, permitting new interpretations of what 
comprises Buddhist practice in the modern period32.
The full existential ramifications of the related Buddhist notions of 
anatta (no-self) and śunyata (emptiness), however, are not always 
recognized in everyday thought and practice. People frequently retain 
conventional notions of their continuing identity and personhood, instead 
directing their efforts at weakening feelings of selfishness and egotism. This 
ambiguity is also reflected in Buddhist writings. Many Buddhist narratives, 
including the Jataka stories, promote the notion of an enduring personality 
that either enjoys or suffers the effects of karmic deeds done in previous 
lives. At the same time, however, Buddhist teachings clearly state that there 
is no equivalent to a permanent soul that transmigrates from one lifetime to 
the next. Not only do many texts argue that there is nothing permanent 
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about one’s individuality, many philosophical works also claim that 
conventional notions of one’s individuality are mistaken and empty in the 
sense that there is no existence that is not conditioned by other equally 
empty factors. Dependent Arising is a significant Buddhist idea because it 
reinforces the notions that life is impermanent, subject to change and 
dissolution, and radically interdependent with other factors. While some 
Buddhists in the modern world are willing to accept and embrace these 
ideas, others may simply maintain the continual change and 
interconnectedness of all life33.
More generally, modern representations of Buddhism often stress the 
pragmatic nature of the religion. In keeping with humanistic and utilitarian 
values, modern practitioners frequently emphasize the practical steps that 
may be taken to bring people closer to Awakening. In these instances, the 
Buddha is represented as a role model whom modern practitioners can fully 
imitate, particularly when it comes to following the Noble Eightfold Path. 
The eight steps of this path ought to be practiced concurrently to put an end 
to suffering and attain the transcendent, indescribable, and unconditioned 
state of nirvana. This path (marga) that the Buddha is said to have taught 
comprises (1) right view, (2) right intention, (3) right speech, (4) right 
action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) 
right concentration. When practiced together, the Noble Eightfold Path 
works to purify one’s bodily, verbal, and mental acts, weakening the 
negative factors that promote suffering in oneself and others and 
strengthening one’s ability to make progress toward nirvana. These steps are 
held to develop morality, meditation, and wisdom, leading to clear vision 
and blameless conduct34.  
Buddhists everywhere revere as a source of wisdom and guidance 
the Dhamma of the Buddha, his teaching about the ultimate nature of reality 
and the way of life that accords with this35.
Another form of this objection is the assertion that the Buddha 
taught a religion and not a philosophy. The first part of this contention 
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presumably is correct, depending on what we mean by the term “religion”. 
The Buddha did not believe in God and hence did not regard his teaching as 
divine revelation. But in many respects it is appropriate to consider his 
teaching a religion – for example, it centrally involves a notion of 
transcendence. However, that the Buddha’s teaching is a religion in these 
respects does not entail that it is not, or does not include, a philosophy. The 
terms “Christian philosophy” or “Jewish philosophy” are not ordinarily 
considered oxymorons, and the existence of God is an important part of the 
theories of many canonical figures in Western philosophy36.
The Buddha challenges the belief, so typical in Western philosophy, 
that rational reflection is the main means of attaining this knowledge. The 
Buddha thought reason was valuable but insufficient for enlightenment, and 
he thought meditation was crucial. The meditation techniques he taught 
were intended to develop our powers of concentration and, in a special 
sense, observation37.
A morally ordered universe 
The Buddha believed every human being could achieve 
enlightenment because he thought human nature and the universe have 
certain objective features we can know. There is no motif more central to 
the Sutta Pitaka than that the Buddha acquired knowledge of reality that 
resulted in liberation – and that any of us, with great effort, can do the same 
thing. It is true that the Buddha’s teaching stresses the impermanence of 
things, but this goes hand-in-hand with an emphasis on the law-governed 
nature of the universe. Though the world is in constant change, it is very far 
from being in a state of chaos. Knowledge of the order of the universe is the 
key to enlightenment.  
The world depicted by modern science is often said to be morally 
neutral or meaningless. By contrast, the universe portrayed by the Buddha is 
morally ordered. This need not mean the Buddha’s teaching is incompatible 
with modern science, but it does mean the Buddha would regard the world 
of modern science as incomplete insofar as this world was taken to be 
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morally neutral. For the Buddha, the moral order of the universe is 
contained first and foremost in the doctrines of kamma and rebirth. 
The doctrine of kamma is a simple idea: each action is good or bad, 
primarily on account of the moral quality of the intention it expresses; and, 
sooner or later, a good action brings well-being to the person who performs 
it, while a bad action brings the opposite. Put in these terms, the idea is one 
form of a commonly accepted belief in cosmic justice, and as such it is 
compatible with many religious traditions. What distinguishes the Buddha’s 
doctrine of kamma from classical monotheistic traditions, however, is that 
the causal relationship between good or bad actions and happy or unhappy 
results is not understood as the effect of a just god dispensing rewards and 
punishments. For the Buddha, this causal relationship is an impersonal 
feature of the natural world: even as a plant flourishes when it receives 
appropriate amounts of light, moisture and nutrition, so our lives flourish 
when we perform morally good actions. Our present state of well-being is 
always a causal result of our past actions. However, past actions do not 
determine future actions: we are always free to choose well or poorly in our 
current situation. Past actions determine how happy we are, and to some 
extent our character, but they do not directly determine the morality of what 
we do. 
The Buddha also believed that each person lives a series of lives that 
extends indefinitely into the past and could extend indefinitely into the 
future. These lives could take the form not only of human lives, but also of 
animals at the lower end of the spectrum and of deities at the other end. The 
causality is the result of my past actions in this and all previous lives; and 
my actions of kamma operate through the entire series. Hence, my happiness 
in this life will affect my future happiness in this and all lives to come. The 
doctrine of kamma and rebirth is closely connected, and they are the 
framework of much popular Buddhist belief in the world today. But the 
Buddha also thought it was possible to escape the series of rebirths: 
achieving full enlightenment in any one life permanently brings the series to 
an end. This is Nibbāna – the ultimate state of happiness. The central 
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instruction of the Buddha focused on attaining Nibbāna and thereby 
escaping rebirth.38
Co-Existence 
Good conduct is the first requirement for an individual’s progress. 
The five principles or Panchashila were conceived by the Buddha, and 
although they originated in India, with the disappearance of the Buddha they 
ceased to be mentioned here. But in Buddhist countries a child is sometimes 
taught Panchashila by hiss parents or preceptors. The Buddha was a man of 
peace, and among the world religions only Buddhism can claim that it never 
employed violent means for its propagation. Buddhist missionaries practiced 
the doctrine of co-existence. China, Japan, Korea, Tibet, Mongolia, Ceylon, 
Burma, Thailand and Indo-China are still predominantly Buddhist countries 
and a thousand years ago, India, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Java, too, 
followed the Buddha’s teachings. In the history of these countries you find 
no instance where faith was propagated with the intentional destruction or 
humiliation of other faiths. When Chinese Turkistan was converted to Islam, 
Nestorians and Buddhists lived peacefully side by side. But a new faith 
came with fire and sword and the followers of these two religions were 
forced to flee. The Nestorians had no asylum nearby, while the Buddhists 
had a country of their faith-Ladakh, across the mountains, to which place 
they took the Nestorians who were allowed to build their monasteries. Later 
they were assimilated among the people, or perhaps they were unmarried 
monks and nuns, so that their faith passed with that generation. But the cross 
of the Nestorians remained in Ladakh to show how brotherly love and the 
doctrine of co-existence were practiced.39
 The five precepts or Panchashila of Buddhism are: (1) Thou shalt 
not kill. (2) Thou shalt not steal. (3) Thou shalt not make improper sex 
indulgence. (4) Thou shalt not tell a lie. (5) Thou shalt not use intoxicants. 
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 The ethical teachings of the Buddha are summed up in an ancient 
stanza: “Avoiding all sins; practicing meritorious deeds; control of one’s 
own mind”. These are broad-based and rational. 
Buddhists, however, believe in the principle of co-existence, and 
Buddhism did not discharge the “God” of different faiths. It allowed the 
people to have their idols and venerate them, since it thought that the 
Buddha’s philosophy needed higher development of the mind to appreciate.
 The mundane and the sacred overlap as the precepts set down by the 
Buddha were more concerned with how one treats the other in every day 
life.  
The motivational state is precept-based and influences one’s 
affective, cognitive and behavioral states. 
Athymhormia: a neurobehavioral syndrome 
Athymhormia, coined in 1922 by two French psychiatrists, Maurice 
Dide and Paul Guiraud, is a neurological disorder that reveals the influence 
of motivation and affect on perception, cognition and action. It is more often 
associated with other cognitive deficits, especially memory, attentional and 
other behavioral changes. 
Athymhormia, etymologically derived from Gk. a + thumos + 
hormê, indicates the absence of sensations, sentiments, feelings, impulse, 
appetite and tendencies. Habib (2004) proposed a tentative model of how a 
subset of the basal ganglia (i.e. the limbic part) subserves in humans 
motivational functions. By observing bilateral lesions of this system and the 
behavioral changes produced by them, Habib studied two cases admitted 
with “recent and abrupt behavioral changes” and “decrease in interest”, both 
presenting athymhormia in striatal lesions. Both patients were apathetic, 
inactive, prostrate, abulic, making no plans, showing no evidence of needs, 
will, or desire, with decrease in spontaneous activity, loss of appetite and 
food preferences. Moderate slowing of movements, poor spontaneous verbal 
expression, no personal complaint, decrease in activity and motivation, 
inertia and passivity, not thinking of anything, were common to both of 
them. Both patients showed a striking reduction in spontaneous motion and 
speech, with subjacent “mental emptiness”, a loss of interest for previously 
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motivating activities and an apparent flatness or poor expressiveness of 
affect. The patients were not depressed, since there was no sadness in any of 
them and no negative thoughts.  
In one case of carbon monoxide poisoning and another of a wasp 
sting, a French group of neurologists of Laplane in Paris reported similar 
behavioral syndrome, which was ascribed to damage to another subcortical 
structure: the globus pallidus. Both cases showed major motor and 
behavioral inertia and loss of spontaneous mental activity.  
Habib (2004) observed that a similar neurobehavioral picture 
emerged from two separate lesion sites and concluded that there must be in 
fact a disrupting of a neural system which included both brain sites: “the 
frontal-striatal-pallidal loops, especially the limbic loop”, seeing thus the 
syndrome linked to the emotional brain. Cummings (1993) offered a 
neuroanatomical model of the connections between the basal ganglia and 
frontal cortex. Cortico-subcortical connections are organized in several 
loops functioning in parallel, according to their functions. Alexander et al. 
(1990) described five functional domains represented by basal ganglia-
thalamocortical circuits: “motor” or “oculomotor” circuits, two “prefrontal” 
circuits and a “limbic” circuit (tentatively related to emotions and 
motivational processes).40 The limbic loop referred to by Alexander et al. is 
very similar to the limbic loop postulated by Nauta (1986) to be involved in 
motivational and emotional control in rat. Apicella et al. (1991), working on 
responses to reward in monkey, indicated that the limbic (ventral) 
striatopallidum to be the “interface between motivation and action”, the site 
of “conversion of motivational processes into behavioral output”.  
The limbic system and its influence on action 
Habib (2004) thinks that considering the disorder as ‘a fundamental 
defect in converting past or present emotional experiences into an actual 
action’ is not sufficient. He searched for a mechanism that would connect 
long-term memory with the retrieval of affective value of a given stimulus 
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as well as for the systems in charge of controlling movement initiation, 
mental activity and emotional expression.  
Figure 1.   
The Limbic Loop: An Interface Between Emotion and Action41 (Habib, 2004) 
He proposed a limbic loop as the interface between emotion and 
action. At the emotional level (top part of the figure), the stimulus 
reinforcement association, which takes place in the amygdala, continuously 
reformulated and evaluated by the orbitofrontal cortex, determines goal-
directed behaviors (bottom of the figure) by informing the ventral striatum 
(including accumbens), which drives the rest of the system by a mechanism 
best represented by interlinked gears. The dopaminergic afferents would 
play the role of “fueling” the system.  
                                                
41
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mechanism best represented by interlinked gears. The dopaminergic afferents would play 
the role of “fueling” the system. 
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Each loop possesses a specific output (motor acts for the motor loop, 
emotional expression for the limbic one and spontaneous mental activity for 
the associative one), accounting for the three main symptoms of the 
athymhormic syndrome. According to this representation, damage to the 
limbic loop, while leaving intact the other two, would result in impaired 
spontaneous cognitive and motor activity, giving rise to the characteristic 
symptoms of athymhormia: lack of spontaneous action (but intact motor 
functioning) and poverty of spontaneous thinking (but relatively preserved 
intellectual capacities). This model provides a plausible framework for the 
curious association between loss of motor and mental activity, as well as 
their reversibility upon external stimulation. According to the model, 
however, blunting of emotional expression would be, unlike the other two 
symptoms, a nonreversible phenomenon, but this does not preclude possible 
preservation of emotional experience itself. (Habib, 2004: 521) 
Habib, through his research on athymhormia, provided a model of 
motivational deficiency. As a disorder, athymhormia points out to a link 
between motor activity and cognitive processes through the limbic system. 
The link is provided by the dopamergetic afferents that would play the role 
of “fueling” the system. 
Unseen Identity Loop
Based on Habib’s proposed mechanism, we suggest that a similar 
mechanism would apply in the case of the Buddhist identity. The Eightfold 
Path, as we considered them divided into levels of cognition, action and 
attention processes, are supposed to be practiced all at the same time. This 
proposal matches too the present theories of neuroscience. 
According to the Buddha, the world is not stable in any way. There 
are no things with identity. Everything is in a constant process of change in 
every respect. We consider that the attention processes, which in the 
Eightfold Path corresponds to the right effort, right understanding and the 
right meditation, function similarly to the limbic loop proposed by Habib. 
The attention would thus behave as a gear between the other two gears 
cognition and action. They could be seen as working in tandem and 
continuously influencing each other. 
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Attention Action  Cognition 
Three 
Divisions 
Insight/Wisdom 
(Sanskrit: prajñā,  
Pāli: paññā) 
Morality 
(Sanskrit: śīla,  
Pāli: sīla) 
Concentration 
(Sanskrit and  
Pāli: samādhi) 
Eightfold 
Path 
Right view 
Right resolve/intention 
Right speech 
Right action 
Right livelihood 
Right effort 
Right understanding 
Right meditation 
Level Cognition Action Attention 
Table 2. The Eightfold Path and its Three Divisions 
Figure 2.  The Identity Loop: Attention as the connections link between  cognition 
and action. Affective states contribute to the arousal of attentional processes which 
further influence cognition and action.
Cahn and Polich (2006) refer to meditation as “describing practices 
that self regulate the body and mind, thereby affecting mental events by 
engaging a specific attentional set”. Davidson and Goleman (1977), 
regarding the regulation of attention as central to all methods of meditation, 
divided the meditative types into two: mindfulness and concentrative. 
Mindfulness methods allow thoughts, feelings and sensations to arise while 
maintaining a specific attentional stance. Concentrative methods involve 
focus on specific mental or sensory activity. Mindfulness methods involve 
maintenance of attention in a state of open perception, awareness of the 
phenomenal field, open perceptivity while concentrative methods would 
require narrowing of attentional resources. (Cahn and Polich, 2006).  
Austin (2000), Forman (1990), Travis et al.(2002), and West (1987) 
refer to traits born of long-term meditation as heightening awareness of the 
sensory field, and a shift in the relationship to thoughts, feelings, and 
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experience of self. States of awareness sometimes referred to as “the 
witness” or “transcendental experience” are also claimed to ensue over time. 
This experience consists of contentless awareness that is independent of 
mental activities, can be present during deep sleep, and produces the 
perception of an altered self-identity wherein the separation perceived 
between the observer and the observed grows ever fainter. As the perceived 
lack of separation develops, the sense of self seems to shift from mental 
thought centered in the body to an impersonal beingness. This awareness is 
related to the essential emptiness of a separate and isolated self-identity. 
It seems thus, that the sense of identity shifts continuously and 
probably one could speak of a Buddhist identity only in terms of outcome 
actions: right speech, right action and right livelihood. 
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